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Tax Structure and Female Labour Market Participation: Evidence 
from Ireland 
 
1. Introduction 
The taxation of couples is arguably “the single most important problem in personal income taxation” 
(Apps and Rees, 2007). One of the critical elements in framing policy in this area is the extent and 
nature of labour supply responses to alternative tax treatments of couples. This paper investigates the 
influence of tax structure on the labour supply of married women in Ireland. Since the 1960s, Ireland 
has moved from a system of joint taxation (with income tax depending on aggregate income) to an 
income splitting system (implemented through doubled bands and allowances for married couples) to 
a system with greater independence between the taxes of husbands and wives. At the same time 
married women’s labour market participation has risen from very low levels to rates close to the EU 
average.  
We investigate the influence of tax structure on Irish women’s labour market participation 
using a labour supply model based on cross-sectional data for 1994, which has the unique advantage 
of incorporating information on preferred hours of work, rather than simply actual hours. We 
estimate preferences within a discrete-choice structural model of participation choices and preferred 
hours (see, for example, van Soest (1995) and Blundell (2001)). Estimation is in the context of an 
“income-splitting” tax structure, which imposes high marginal rates of tax on secondary earners. We 
then simulate the impact of tax reforms introducing greater independence in the treatment of couples 
on the labour supply of both wives and husbands. We compare the results of these reforms to the tax 
structure with alternative forms of tax cut. The results are set in the context the rise in married 
women’s labour market participation in recent decades. Our model  estimates the first order 
behavioural labour supply effects. It does not aim at a full analysis of equilibrium effects, although 
the results we obtain could be used as input for a computational general equilibrium model in which 
such effects can be investigated.1 
 The types of tax reform that we want to consider extend beyond changing marginal tax rates. 
We want to look at, for example, joint taxation of spouses versus separate taxation, or systems which 
can be seen as somewhere in between these two systems. For example, we want to look at separate 
filing with the possibility to transfer the tax free allowance. More generally, we want to be able to 
look at complicated budget sets for two earner households, involving nonconvexities and 
discontinuities. Even for single persons or one-adult households, the Irish tax-transfer system 
involves nonconvexities, due to, for example, thresholds in social welfare premiums. We therefore 
need a framework which is able to deal with complex budget sets.  This makes the traditional 
continuous approach, developed and surveyed by, for example, Blomquist (1983), Hausman (1985), 
                                                 
1 Recent work moving beyond the first-order impacts includes Creedy and Duncan (2005). 
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Hausman and Ruud (1984), and Moffitt (1986, 1990a, 1990b), inappropriate for our purposes. The 
traditional type of model in principle requires budget sets which are piece-wise linear and convex. 
Although it is possible to add nonconvexities such as fixed costs of working (see Kapteyn et al., 
1990, for example), each nonconvexity or other additional complexity of the budget set, substantially 
increases the computational task of calculating the utility maximum. This becomes particularly 
burdensome in the two-dimensional case, where both spouses choose their optimal labour supply 
simultaneously. 
 This drawback can be avoided by treating the family's choice set as a finite set. For example, 
instead of allowing an individual to choose any number of working hours on the interval [0,80] (with 
corresponding net incomes), the assumption can be made that the individual can only choose from 
the finite set {0,8,16,...,48} (with corresponding net incomes). The choice set then consists of 7 
instead of infinitely many points. The utility maximum can be obtained directly by comparing the 
seven values of the (direct) utility function in these points. Several studies have used discrete choice 
sets which only distinguish between not working, part-time working, and full-time working. See, for 
example, Blundell (2001), Bingley and Walker (2001), Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990), Keane and 
Moffitt (1998) and Moffitt (1984). To capture enough detail of a complex budget sets with 
nonconvexities and discontinuities, however, a finer grid, with more than three points per individual, 
seems necessary. For the one individual case, such models have been widely used by, for example, 
Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Tummers and Woittiez (1991), van Soest et al. (1990). Van Soest 
(1995) analyses a discrete choice model for family labour supply. Refinements of his model, for 
example allowing for fixed costs of working, and using information on actual as well as desired hours 
of work, have been introduced in, for example, Callan and van Soest (1994), Creedy et al. (2006), 
Euwals and van Soest  (1999) and Haan (2006). 
 The current paper uses a discrete choice model of this latter type. We focus on married 
couples. We assume that the two spouses have a common utility function.2 The function arguments 
are family income, leisure of the husband, and leisure of the wife. We will use a direct quadratic 
utility function, which is easy to interpret and can deal with negative incomes (which can arise due to 
fixed costs), while it also has the desirable property of local second order flexibility. 
We allow for preference variation across households through observed as well as unobserved 
characteristics. This is achieved by making several parameters of the utility function dependent on 
characteristics such as age and family composition, and a random error term. Moreover, we add 
independent error terms to the values of the utility function at all alternatives in the choice set, with 
the same specification as in the multinomial logit model. 
 To explain why there are relatively few people with a part-time job, we incorporate fixed 
costs of work. These fixed costs are again allowed to depend upon observed and unobserved 
                                                 
2 Vermeulen (2006)  
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characteristics of the family and its members. The fixed costs are fully integrated in the structural 
model: they are subtracted from family income if someone works, and thus enter the utility function 
through income. Increasing fixed costs reduces income if someone works, and will thus make not 
working relatively more attractive compared to working. 
 We assume that before tax hourly wage rates do not vary with hours worked. This assumption 
is maintained in most of the neoclassical labour supply models, although some exceptions exist, such 
as Moffitt (1984), Tummers and Woittiez (1991), and Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990). Thus each 
individual is assumed to have a unique before tax wage rate. Together with hours worked and the tax 
system, the before tax wage rate determines net earnings. A common problem in labour supply 
models with non-workers is that wage rates of non-workers are not observed. To account for this, a 
wage equation is estimated, and wage predictions are constructed for non-workers. Due to the non-
linear nature of the labour supply model, however, replacing wage rates by their predictions leads to 
inconsistent estimates, even if the wage predictions themselves are unbiased. To account for this, 
wage rate prediction errors are explicitly incorporated in the model, as additional unobserved error 
terms. 
 The labour supply model is based upon the assumption that individuals or couples maximize 
(joint) utility, and thus aims at estimating preferences of those who supply labour. It is therefore 
estimated using information on preferred hours of work, so that deviations between preferred and 
actual hours of work - due to, for example, involuntary unemployment or a lack of part-time jobs - 
are allowed for. 
 The questions on preferred hours of work in our data do not explicitly state whether or not the 
spouse is also assumed to change to his or her optimum. We will assume that each individual’s 
answer is based on the assumption that the spouse also adjusts to the family optimum. An alternative 
would be to assume that the spouse is constrained at his or her actual number of hours, but 
incorporating this into the model would require joint modelling of actual and desired hours of both 
spouses. This is beyond the purpose of the current paper. 
 To account for the various unobserved error terms, the model is estimated with simulated 
maximum likelihood (with correction for the selective nature of the second sample): the likelihood 
function is replaced by an approximation based upon simulation, and the simulated approximation of 
the likelihood is maximized. The estimator is asymptotically equivalent to exact maximum 
likelihood. 
The data we use are from the 1994 wave of the Living in Ireland Panel Survey. This is a 
representative household panel containing about 1,300 married couples in the age group 18 to 65. 
The results are used to analyse the sensitivity of labour supply for wages, and to analyse the first 
order labour supply effects of a proposed reform of the tax system. This is done by means of 
simulations. First, participation rates and average hours worked are computed on the basis of the 
estimates and the actual wages and tax rules. Second, the simulation is repeated for various 
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alternative scenarios. The first scenario is that all wage rates of husbands or wives are raised by the 
same percentage. This  leads to estimates of own and cross wage elasticities of both spouses. 
The focus of the simulations is the analysis of labour supply effects of changing the income 
tax rules. For the data period (and for many years before and after) the Irish tax system could be 
characterized as embodying “income splitting”, though technically this was implemented by 
affording double allowances and rate bands to married couples.3 This system is commonly seen as a 
disincentive for married women to join the labour market, since the secondary worker (usually the 
wife) faces the higher marginal tax rate of the primary worker (the husband). We will analyse the 
possible labour supply effects of changing to an individualized tax system. 
 The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. The 
labour supply model is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the results and the labour 
supply elasticities. Section 5 discusses the actual Irish income tax system and the proposed reforms. 
In Section 6 we discuss the outcomes of our simulation analysis of the labour supply effects of these 
reforms. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
Survey respondents are quite commonly asked about their actual hours of work in the paid labour 
market. But actual hours worked do not always represent the individual’s preferred hours of work. 
For example, an individual may wish to work fewer hours, but cannot obtain part-time work with 
similar conditions to the full-time job. On the other hand, an individual may find himself or herself 
unemployed, but may wish to obtain a full-time job and be actively searching for one. Labour supply 
models which ignore this fact, and treat actual hours as identical with desired hours, are likely to be 
imperfect guides to labour market behaviour. In attempting to identify the impact of taxes and net 
wages on labour supply decisions, there are considerable advantages to be gained from working with 
information on individual’s preferred hours of work. In the Irish context, such information is 
available from the 1994 wave of the Living in Ireland survey (LII), which for this reason is the 
dataset employed here.4 The survey, the Irish element of the European Community Household Panel, 
has been widely used in studies of poverty, income distribution and the labour market and has been 
found to be broadly representative of the Irish population. (For a full description of the data, 
including checks on its general representativeness, see Callan et al. 1996).  
                                                 
3 Cohabiting couples did not benefit from this treatment: they were treated as single persons by the tax system, but in a 
similar fashion to married couples by the welfare system. There were only a small number of cohabiting couples in the 
survey, and they were excluded from the present analysis. 
4 There have, of course, been considerable changes in the Irish labour market since then, most notably a rise in female 
participation rates, a fall in unemployment and a substantial increase in total employment. It seems likely, however, that 
these changes are associated more with changes in the opportunities facing individuals than with a sharp change in 
preferences. This suggests that results such as those obtained here – identifying preferences and examining the likely 
response to alternative policy experiments – have a strong continuing relevance. 
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The basic information used to construct the preferred hours variable comes from a number of 
questions, depending on the labour market status of the individual concerned. For those who are in 
employment, and working in a paid job for more than 15 hours per week (a cut-off imposed by the 
design requirements of Eurostat), the information comes from the answer to the question: 
Suppose that you could continue to work in your present job, and could choose exactly 
how many hours to work. Your hourly rate of pay would not change, but your total 
weekly pay would vary depending on how many hours you worked. How many hours per 
week would you like to work? 
(Living in Ireland, 1994 Questionnaire, question A.39) 
 
For those who are either unemployed, or seeking other work to replace or in addition to a job of less 
than 15 hours per week, preferred hours are taken as the answer to the question: 
If you could find a suitable job, how many hours per week would you prefer to work in 
this new job? 
(Living in Ireland, 1994 Questionnaire, question D.2) 
 
If, however, the individual is not seeking work – for reasons which could include study, training, 
housework, caring for children or others, retirement, personal illness or injury – then preferred hours 
are taken as being zero.  
For those working less than 15 hours per week, and not seeking additional work, there are two other 
possibilities, based on the response to the question: 
What is your MAIN reason for working less than full-time? 
(Living in Ireland, 1994 Questionnaire, q. C.5)  
 
If such a worker states that the main reason is that “I want but cannot find a full-time job” then 
preferred hours are set equal to 40 (the modal value for full-time workers). But other reasons (such as 
being in education/training, caring for children or others, personal illness or disability, not wanting a 
full-time job) lead to actual hours being taken as the best indication of preferred hours. 
Table 1: Criteria Defining the Sample used for Labour Supply Analysis 
Criterion 
No. of cases 
excluded 
No. of cases 
remaining 
Married couple, both aged 65, 
 not in full-time education, with  
 responses to individual  
 questionnaire 2,260 
Exclude: Self-employed, farmer 696 1,564 
Exclude: Cases with missing 
values 165 1,399 
Exclude: Ill or disabled 87 1,312 
Exclude: Persons exiting a job  16 1,296 
   
Final sample  1,296 
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Table 1 sets out the criteria used to identify the sample on which the model was to be 
estimated. The survey contained responses from 2,260 married couples where both partners were 
aged under 65 and neither partner was in full-time education.5 Almost 700 couples were excluded 
from the analysis because at least one spouse was engaged in farming or other self-employment. This 
is because the labour supply choices facing the self-employed are rather different, and even the 
measurement of hours of work and the financial return from work become more difficult. While this 
is a very common exclusion in the international literature on labour supply, it affects proportionately 
more cases in the Irish context – particularly because of the higher rate of participation in farming. 
The remaining exclusions – of cases with missing information on variables needed for the analysis, 
of couples including a person classifying his or her labour force status as “ill or disabled”,6 and of 
persons who at the time of interview were leaving a job – amount to about 270 cases. The final 
sample for analysis includes information on 1,296 couples.  
Tables 2, 3 and 4 set out basic descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis. We 
note some key features of the hours and wages variables below. On average, husbands are in paid 
employment for almost 32 hours per week, as against 10 hours per week for wives. This gap is only 
partly accounted for by a lower rate of labour market participation among women. For those in paid 
employment, there is still a substantial gap (42 hours per week for men and 28 for women). On 
average men’s preferred hours of work were greater than their actual hours (36 hours as against 32 
hours per week), but women’s preferred hours of work were slightly lower than their actual hours (10 
hours as against 11 hours per week).  
 
 
                                                 
5 In principle, cohabiting couples could also have been included in the analysis, provided that the rules governing their tax 
liabilities and welfare entitlements could also have been modelled. The small potential increase in sample size did not 
warrant the considerable additional time and effort which would have been required at this stage. The issues involved 
could be revisited with a dataset incorporating a larger number of cohabiting couples. 
6 Other persons with an illness or disability hampering daily activity are included, and this information on their 
illness/disability status is used in the analysis. 
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Table 2: Variable definitions and sample statistics 
Variable and unit of measurement Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Preferred hours per week  — husband 0 80.0 35.8 14.1 
 — wife 0 65.0 11.1 14.7 
Usual hours in all jobs per week — husband 0 100.0 31.8 20.2 
 — wife 0 84.0 10.0 15.6 
Gross wage (Ir£ per hour)  — husband 0 54.8 6.82 5.99 
  — wife 0 26.7 2.41 4.22 
Potential experience (years)  — husband 3.9 52.1 28.1 11.0 
 — wife 0.4 52.6 26.2 10.8 
Husband’s highest educational qualification:     
 None beyond primary 0 1 0.364 0.481 
 Group Certificate 0 1 0.106 0.309 
 Intermediate/Junior Certificate 0 1 0.141 0.348 
 Leaving Certificate 0 1 0.212 0.409 
 Diploma 0 1 0.052 0.223 
 University degree/higher degree 0 1 0.123 0.329 
Wife’s highest educational qualification     
 None beyond primary 0 1 0.360 0.480 
 Group Certificate 0 1 0.052 0.223 
 Intermediate/Junior Certificate 0 1 0.186 0.389 
 Leaving Certificate 0 1 0.291 0.454 
 Diploma 0 1 0.046 0.209 
 University degree/higher degree 0 1 0.065 0.246 
Big town 0 1 0.520 0.500 
City 0 1 0.407 0.491 
Dublin 0 1 0.309 0.462 
Age of husband (years) 23.3 65.0 44.7 10.4 
Age of wife (years) 19.1 65.0 42.7 10.1 
Illness/disability hampering daily activity — husband 0 1 0.122 0.327 
      — wife 0 1 0.138 0.345 
Child in 0-4 Age Bracket? (0=no, 1=yes) 0 1 0.279 0.449 
Child in 5-12 Age Bracket? (0=no, 1=yes) 0 1 0.471 0.499 
Number of children aged under 18 0 9 1.74 1.50 
Occupational pension (Ir£/week) — husband 0 759.0 8.5 44.6 
 — wife 0 161.0 0.4 6.6 
Mortgage interest (Ir£/week) 0 163.8 20.5 25.6 
Investment income (Ir£/week)  — husband 0 143.8 2.2 9.9 
 — wife 0 126.2 0.5 4.3 
No. of children eligible for Child Benefit 0 8 1.62 1.45 
Memorandum item: Number of cases 1,296 
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Table 3.: Distribution of family size 
No. of children aged under 18 % of couples 
None 26.6 
1 19.2 
2 24.8 
3 18.7 
4 6.9 
5 or more 3.8 
All 100.0 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for nonzero cases 
Variable 
Nonzero 
cases as 
% of all 
cases Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Preferred hours — husband 89.6 1 80 39.9 7.6 
  — wife 41.7 3 65 26.5 10.4 
Usual hours in all jobs  — husband 75.4 2 100 42.1 10.1 
   — wife 34.9 2.5 84.0 28.6 13.0 
Gross hourly wage (Ir£/hour) — husband 75.4 1.6 54.8 9.04 5.24 
 — wife 35.0 0.8 26.7 6.90 4.47 
Occupational pension (Ir£/week) — husband 5.2 7.2 759.0 161.3 116.2 
     — wife 0.4 30.4 161.0 93.7 56.8 
Mortgage interest 63.3 0.1 163.8 32.5 25.5 
Investment income (Ir£/week)  — husband 25.2 <0.05 143.8 8.6 18.3 
    — wife 10.7 <0.05 126.2 4.6 12.5 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Preferred Hours of Work for Husbands and Wives in Paid Employment, 1994 
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 Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of preferred hours of work for husbands and wives in paid 
employment. There is a sharp “spike” in preferred hours for men at about 40 hours per week, with 
almost 60 per cent of all those with positive preferred hours indicating that this is their preferred 
situation. By contrast, the distribution of preferred hours for married women is bi-modal, with less 
sharp peaks at both 20 and 40 hours. Almost 80 per cent of women with positive preferred hours wish 
to work for less than 40 hours, with a considerable spread over the different hours categories. Just 
under half of married men, and just over 70 per cent of married women have actual hours of work 
which are approximately equal to their preferred hours of work. 
Gross hourly wages are constructed by dividing the usual gross wage per week or per month 
by the usual number of hours worked during the relevant pay period. The gross wage of employed 
married women in the 1994 sample was £6.90, or about three-quarters of the average wage for 
married men (£9.04). Figure 2.2 illustrates the distribution of gross hourly wages for men and women 
in paid employment. Around 44 per cent of married women had an hourly gross wage of less than £5 
in 1994, as against only 15 per cent of married men. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Gross Hourly Wage (IR£ per hour) for Husbands and Wives in Paid Employment, 1994 
  
 
 
3. Model 
We present a static neoclassical structural labour supply model for two joint decision makers 
(husband and wife). The basic framework is similar to that of van Soest (1995). Husband and wife 
are assumed to maximize a joint utility function for the couple, taking account of their own and their 
spouse's leisure, and of family income. 
Utility 
 The couple’s joint utility depends on both spouses’ leisure (TE-hm for the husband, TE-hf for 
the wife, where TE is the time endowment, and on total net income of the family (y). The main 
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components of net income are earnings of both spouses, asset income, and child allowances . 
Earnings of other household members are excluded. We follow the bulk of the labour supply 
literature, in which the difference between the time endowment and hours worked is called leisure 
time, but actually comprises an aggregate of all time use categories except for paid work (see Apps 
and Rees, 1996,  for a critique of this). The model would be consistent with utility maximization in a 
life cycle framework with intertemporally additive preference if net income could be replaced by 
total expenditures (see Blundell and Walker, 1986). Since our data do not contain any information on 
consumption expenditures or savings, we cannot do this, and remain within a static framework. 
 We use a quadratic direct utility function:7 
 
U(v) = v'Av + b'v, v=(y, (80-hm), (80-hf))'                                             (1) 
 
 Without loss of generalization, the time endowment has been set to 80 hours per week. 
Another choice of the time endowment or a specification in terms of hours worked instead of leisure, 
would give exactly the same model. The specification in terms of leisure is chosen to simplify the 
interpretation of the results. Without restrictions on the parameters, this utility function is locally 
second order flexible. In principle there is no reason to prefer this utility function to any other direct 
utility function with the same (or larger) flexibility. Van Soest (1995), for example, use a direct 
utility function which is quadratic in log income and log leisure of both spouses (direct translog). 
This has the drawback that it cannot deal with negative incomes, which imposes restrictions on the 
way in which fixed costs can be incorporated (see below). 
We impose parameter restrictions to guarantee that utility increases with income, since this is 
necessary for the economic interpretation of the model.8 For a similar reason, we will impose that 
utility decreases with leisure of both spouses. We do not impose quasi-concavity of preferences and 
thus avoid the critique by MaCurdy et al. (1990). 
 In the specification of the direct utility function in (1), A is a 3x3 matrix of unknown 
parameters and b is a three-dimensional vector. We assume that b2 and b3 depend on individual or 
household characteristics, i.e. we allow for variation of preferences across the sample through 
observed characteristics: 
 
bk = X k 'βk + υk k=2,3,        (2) 
 
Here the Xk are vectors of observed characteristics (log age and log age squared of husband 
(in b2) or wife (in b3), a dummy for health problems of husband (in b2) and wife (in b3), number of 
                                                 
7The index for the household is suppressed. 
8This is achieved by penalizing the likelihood. An alternative would be to use a less flexible utility function, such as CES 
(see Vlasblom, 1998). 
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children, and a dummy for the presence of children younger than 6). The error terms υk (k=2,3) 
represent  unobserved characteristics, reflecting unobserved heterogeneity of preferences. We will 
discuss assumptions concerning their distributions below. 
 Husband and wife are assumed to maximize the same utility function. The labour supply 
decision is thus modelled at the household level, as in, for example, Hausman and Ruud (1984) and 
Van Soest (1995). A more general framework would be a game theoretic model with different utility 
functions for the two spouses (see Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1990, for example). This is beyond the 
purpose of the current paper. 
 
Constraints 
 
The answer to the question: "how many hours would you like to work?" is based upon utility 
maximization under constraints. An obvious constraint is the budget restriction: to each choice of the 
number of working hours of husband and wife corresponds a different net income. To determine net 
income as a function of working hours of both spouses, we need  earnings of both spouses, other 
household income (child benefits, asset income), taxes, potential unemployment assistance and other 
social security benefits.  Other household income is always observed and can therefore directly be 
drawn from the data. To determine earnings for each number of working hours for each spouse, we 
assume that gross hourly wage rates do not depend on hours worked (see Section 1). For workers 
with observed wage rate, we can then compute gross earnings for each possible number of working 
hours.  
For non-workers, we need to predict the before tax wage rate. For this purpose, we have 
estimated wage equations for men and women, accounting for selection bias in the usual way (see 
Heckman, 1979). The estimates of the wage equations are then used to predict the wages of non-
workers. Because the labour supply model is nonlinear in wages, it is necessary to take the wage rate 
prediction errors into account to get consistent estimates of the labour supply model (see the 
description of the estimation technique given below). 
 To determine social security benefits in case of working few or zero hours, we take account of 
the basic system of unemployment assistance only. This is relatively easy to model:  families are 
entitled to social assistance if family income falls below the minimum standard of living, which 
depends on age, marital status and family composition (we ignore the fact that these unemployment 
assistance benefits are means tested). We do not model unemployment insurance benefits. This is 
difficult to model due to lack of data and due to the static nature of our framework, since 
unemployment insurance benefits are of a temporary nature. 
Following Van Soest (1995), the budget constraint under which the individual maximizes 
utility will be approximated by a finite number of points. In our benchmark model, we take multiples 
of 8 hours (0,8,..,48) for each individual. This gives 49 points for the couple. We will analyse the 
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sensitivity of our results for the number of points we use. The vectors appearing in the utility function 
are denoted by vj: 
 
 vj = (yj, 80-hmj, 80-hfj)'   (j=1,...,49) 
 
where yj is net family income in the situation where the husband works hmj  hours per week, and the 
wife works hfj  hours per week. 
There are two ways to interpret the answer to the preferred hours question (see Section 2). 
The first corresponds to unrestricted optimization of family utility. In this case, the husband’s and 
wife’s preferred hours yield the vector vj which maximizes utility over the full set of 49 points. The 
second interpretation is that each spouse answers the preferred hours question taking the partner’s 
hours as given. This would correspond to restricted optimization under the constraint that the 
partner’s hours are equal to their actual hours. In this case the husband’s and wife’s preferred hours 
correspond to potentially different vj  which both maximize utility in a set of only seven points. In 
either case, utility maximization is straightforward. First order conditions etc. are not required; the 
choice set is finite. We estimate and simulate the model for the first interpretation. An estimation 
procedure based on the alternative interpretation of the answers to the “preferred hours” question 
gave rise to similar estimates of the elasticities with respect to wages. The main reason for working 
with the unrestricted optimisation interpretation is that policy simulations can then be performed 
without considering actual hours. Our policy simulations focus on the effect of taxes on desired 
hours. If desired hours also depend on (the spouse’s) actual hours, a policy simulation would also 
require an analysis of the response of actual hours to changes in desired hours.  
 
Alternative-specific error terms 
 
The only error terms included so far are random preferences. In addition, we  introduce alternative 
specific error terms as follows: 
 
 u(vj) = U(vj) + εj 
 
We assume that the εj are iid and follow an extreme value distribution. We assume that the answer to 
the desired hours question is based upon maximizing u(vj) rather than U(vj). The εj  can be seen as the 
error made in evaluating alternative j. There are several reasons why these errors are incorporated. 
First, they are needed to give nonzero probability to choices which cannot be optimal for any value of 
the random preferences. Such choices may very well exist in case of a nonconvex or discontinuous 
budget set, where some points on the budget frontier may give very low family income compared to 
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adjacent points. In this sense, they play the same role as the optimization or measurement errors in 
the Hausman (1985) model. The second reason for including the εj is computational: we will see 
below that they facilitate simulated maximum likelihood estimation. In this sense they function as a 
smoothing device. The same interpretation is given to them by Keane and Moffitt (1998). They use 
the same type of error terms, though they impose that the error terms have a small variance compared 
to the remaining part of u(vj) - an assumption we do not make.  
 Due to the assumption on the distribution of the εj  the resulting model shows some similarity 
to the multinomial logit model. The probability that an individual chooses alternative j, conditional 
on wage rates, tax and benefit rules, exogenous variables, and random preference parameters, is 
given by: 
 
P[j] = exp{U(vj )}/∑k  exp{U(vk)}       (3) 
 
Given our interpretation of the desired hours question, the combination of desired hours of both 
spouses (hmj, hfj) reflects the family optimum, and the summation in (3) is over all 49 points in the 
family choice set. Other interpretations of the desired hours questions would imply that the 
summation is over a smaller set.  
 P[j] increases with U(vj) (for given values of the other U(vk)). Since U is increasing in 
income, the utility of working increases with the (before and after tax) wage rate. The utility of non-
participation does not depend upon the wage rate. As a consequence, the participation probability 
increases with the wage rate. On the other hand, the participation probability decreases with the 
benefits level: a higher benefits level increases the utility level if a benefit is received, but does not 
affect utility values of the alternatives where working hours are so large that benefit income is zero. 
 
 
 
 
Fixed costs of working 
 
The model described so far typically underpredicts the number of non-workers. A possible 
explanation is that there are fixed costs of working. In other words, there is some  gain to not working 
compared to all the other possibilities, which makes not working more attractive than working few 
hours per week. The level of the fixed costs may depend on individual and household characteristics 
Xk (k=2,3) We model them as: 
15 
 
FCk = X'αk+ηk,  k=2 (husband) and k=3 (wife) 
 
Here the Xk  are the same family and individual characteristics as in the utility function (see (2)), and 
ηk are error terms reflecting unobserved heterogeneity in fixed costs. In computing the values of the 
utility function, we replace income  yj by yj - FC2 if according to alternative j the husband works, by 
yj - FC3 if  the wife works, and by yj - FC2 - FC3 if, for alternative j, both husband and wife work. 
Since U is increasing with income, positive fixed costs increase the utility of not working compared 
to the utility of not working. They thus make working less attractive, and decrease the probability of 
participation. 
 If we used log income in the utility function, negative values of income corrected for fixed 
costs could not be handled. With normally distributed random errors ηk, this problem would occur 
with positive probability. In such cases, censoring family income to a small positive value would be 
necessary. This can be seen as a drawback of the quadratic in logs specification, which we avoid by 
using the quadratic in levels specification.9 Fixed costs were also used by Callan and van Soest 
(1996) and Euwals and van Soest (1999). Another possibility to explain the lack of part-time jobs is 
to model the availability of part-time jobs using job offer probabilities. This implies that the choice 
set varies across households, with a common probability distribution for all households in the sample. 
This approach is followed by Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Woittiez and Tummers (1991), and van 
Soest et al. (1990).  While this may be plausible for actual hours, it seems less appropriate for 
explaining preferred hours, which should not be affected by availability constraints. Van Soest (1995) 
used disutilities of part-time jobs, assumed to be independent of family characteristics. These 
disutilities reflect search costs of jobs with irregular hours. Again, for explaining preferred hours this 
seems less plausible. 
 
Distribution of error terms 
 
The error terms in the model are the alternative specific errors εj , the random preference terms υk 
(k=2,3), the unobserved heterogeneity in fixed costs ηk (k=2,3), and the error terms in the wage 
equations (ζk , k=2,3, say). We already made the assumption that the εj  follow an iid  generalized 
extreme value distribution. The other error terms are assumed to be normal with mean 0. We assume 
that all the error terms are independent of all the covariates incorporated in the vectors X2 and X3, 
and the regressors in the wage equations. For identification and computational convenience, we 
assume that all the error terms are independent of each other, with some exceptions:  we allow for 
                                                 
In the quadratic in logs utility function model, this problem could be avoided by modeling 
fixed costs multiplicatively, but this seems less plausible from an economic point of view. 
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correlation between ζ2 and υ2  and between ζ3 and  υ3. The main reason for this is that allowing for 
such a correlation makes it possible to capture the division bias in wage rates which can be due to 
mismeasuring actual hours worked. Gong and van Soest (2002) show that in a model for female 
labour supply, such a correlation is significant, and not allowing for it leads to underestimation of the 
wage elasticity. We have also experimented with a non-zero correlation between husband’s and 
wife’s random preference terms υ2 and υ3, to allow for flexible substitution patterns. This correlation, 
however, appears hard to estimate with any reasonable level of accuracy, and we  find setting it to 
zero hardly affects the other results.   
 
Estimation 
 
Due to the multinomial logit nature of the model, estimation by maximum likelihood would be 
straightforward if all wages and all random preference terms and fixed costs heterogeneity terms 
were observed. In that case, the likelihood would follow directly from (3), since the vj would then be 
known functions of parameters, explanatory variables, and observed error terms. Since we do not 
observe the error terms (including those in the wage equations for nonworkers), the likelihood 
contribution is not simply given by (3). Instead, it is given by the mean value of the appropriate 
expression according to (3), with the mean taken over the unobserved errors. Since there are between 
four and six unobserved errors, this implies that a four to six dimensional integral is needed. 
Approximating such an integral by conventional numerical (quadrature) routines is time consuming 
and intractable. A more convenient alternative is simulated maximum likelihood: the integral is 
replaced by a simulated average based upon R independent draws from the (multivariate normal) 
distribution of the unobserved errors (conditional upon the residuals in the equations of the observed 
wages, if any). Due to the law of large numbers, the approximation will be accurate if R becomes 
large. With independent draws across observations, it can be shown that the approximation is 
accurate enough to make simulated maximum likelihood asymptotically equivalent to exact 
maximum likelihood if R tends to infinity faster than the square root of the number of observations 
(see  Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994, for example).  In our benchmark model we will use R=20. We 
have also examined the sensitivity of our results for the choice of R, and find that there is little 
variation for values of R between 20 up to 100 
 The simulated maximum likelihood procedure is greatly facilitated by the presence of the εj. 
Without these, the likelihood contribution conditional on the unobserved error terms would be either 
0 or 1. The simulated likelihood would become a discontinuous function of the parameters, its 
maximization would be numerically much harder, and zero contributions would have to be dealt 
with. Adding the εj  smoothes the likelihood and bounds it away from zero. Adding the εj  could thus 
be seen as a smoothing device, without giving the ε j any real economic meaning. This is the 
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interpretation of McFadden (1989) and Keane and Moffitt (1998).  In both of these articles, the 
variance of the εj is fixed at some small value, while at the same time, a normalization is imposed on 
the systematic part of the utility function. This a priori limits the share of the variance of the εj  in the 
total variance of u(vj). We normalize the variance of εj  only, and do not impose an additional 
normalization on the utility function, and therefore do not impose a priori that the εj  should play only 
a minor role. This corresponds to the view that the εj could have some meaning as alternative specific 
errors in the economic model. We let the data decide how important this is.  
 
4. Results 
The benchmark model has a choice set of 49 points for each family, where each spouse can choose 
between 0, 8,...., 48 hours per week. It is estimated using R=20 simulated maximum likelihood 
replications for each observation. The parameter estimates are shown in Table 2. The upper panel 
refers to the terms in the utility function. The index m denotes the husband and f denotes the wife. A 
positive coefficient on one of the interactions with leisure (i.e. one of the β-s in b2 and b3, see (2)) 
implies a positive effect on the marginal utility of leisure and thus a negative effect on labour supply. 
For both spouses, age is significant, and the age pattern of preferred hours is decreasing with age, 
particularly for older individuals. The presence of children has a strong negative effect on the wife's 
labour supply. For the husband, however, preferred hours increase significantly with the number of 
children, ceteris paribus. The presence of young children (age 0-5) reduces labour supply of women, 
and is insignificant for men. Men who suffer from an illness hampering daily activity have 
significantly lower preferred hours than healthy men, ceteris paribus. For women, the health dummy 
has the same sign, but the effect is much smaller and insignificant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5:  Estimated Parameters for Direct Utility Function and Fixed Costs in Modelling Preferred 
Hours of Work 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
Direct utility function    
(Income/100)2 -0.253 0.032 -7.89 
(Husband’s leisure/10) 2 -0.364 0.045 -8.15 
(Wife’s leisure/10) 2 -0.358 0.040 -8.91 
(Income*Husband’s leisure)/1000 0.316 0.027 11.67 
(Income*Wife’s leisure)/1000 0.073 0.018 4.09 
(Husband’s leisure*Wife’s leisure/100) 0.080 0.018 4.33 
Income/100 1.468 0.560 2.62 
Husband’s leisure/10 46.10 11.14 4.14 
(Husband’s leisure/10)* ln(Husband’s age) -25.51 5.97 -4.27 
(Husband’s leisure/10)* ln(Husband’s age2) 3.646 0.798 4.57 
(Husband’s leisure/10)* Husband has illness? 0.514 0.119 4.32 
(Husband’s leisure/10)* No. of children -0.123 0.031 -3.91 
(Husband’s leisure/10)* Child under 5? 0.084 0.115 0.73 
Wife’s leisure hours/10  23.97 10.39 2.31 
(Wife’s leisure/10)*ln(Wife’s age) -13.19 5.73 -2.30 
(Wife’s leisure/10)*ln(Wife’s age2) 2.080 0.787 2.64 
(Wife’s leisure/10)*Wife has illness? 0.199 0.134 1.48 
(Wife’s leisure/10)*No. of children 0.117 0.037 3.15 
(Wife’s leisure/10)*Child under 5? 0.391 0.109 3.58 
Fixed costs – husband    
const_fc/100 28.86 10.54 2.74 
ln (Husband’s age) -15.90 5.62 -2.83 
ln (Husband’s age2) 2.214 0.747 2.96 
Husband has illness 
 hampering activity? 
0.197 0.109 1.81 
Number of children eligible for Child Benefit -0.025 0.030 -0.84 
Child aged under 5?  
 
-0.060 0.121 -0.49 
Fixed costs – wife    
const_fc/100 19.77 12.20 1.62 
ln (Wife’s age) -11.06 6.69 -1.65 
ln (Wife’s age2) 1.610 0.913 1.76 
Wife has illness hampering activity? 0.361 0.147 2.46 
Number of children eligible for Child Benefit 0.093 0.044 2.12 
Child aged under 5? 
 
0.268 0.131 2.05 
Error terms (See Appendix, Section A.2.4)    
σηm 0.342 0.064 5.36 
σηf -1.007 0.102 -9.84 
σum 0.164 0.083 1.96 
σuf -0.008 0.105 -0.08 
λwm 0.399 0.048 8.33 
λwf 0.279 0.047 5.95 
Note: Variables involving a question (denoted by ?) are dummy variables, with values 1 for a “Yes” and 0 
for a “No”.. 
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 Fixed costs of working depend on the same individual and family characteristics as 
preferences. The estimates imply that average fixed costs amount to the equivalent of about 
€59 per week for me and about €160 per week for women (in 1994 prices). Particularly the 
latter amount seems quite large, and would imply negative family incomes if both spouses 
had  part-time jobs. It should be kept in mind, however, that fixed costs are unobserved, and 
will comprise any incentive for not working, including nonmonetary incentives. For example, 
the lack of attractive small part-time jobs and the difficulty in finding one, might induce 
people not to work and indicate not working as their preferred labour market state. In our 
model, this will be picked up as fixed costs of working also. The estimated standard 
deviations on the error terms in the fixed costs equations (equivalent to €47 for men and €123 
for women) show that a substantial part of the fixed costs are not explained. They also imply 
that for many respondents, fixed costs do not play a role at all.  
For both spouses, the age pattern of fixed costs is U-shaped, with a minimum at about 
age 40. For women, the children variables have the expected sign. The number of children is 
significant at the 5% level, while, the dummy for young children is significant at the 10% 
level only. Still, the point estimates suggest that the added fixed costs of working for women 
due to a young child are about three to four times larger than the additional fixed costs due to 
an older child. For the husbands’ fixed costs of working, children do not play a role.  The 
illness dummy has the expected positive sign for both spouses. Somewhat surprisingly 
perhaps, its effect is larger and more significant for women than for men. 
For both men and women, we find a significantly positive covariance between the 
error term in the wage equation and the random preference term in the marginal utility of 
leisure. For women in particular, the correlation is quite strong and the correlation coefficient 
is close to –1. Since the marginal utility of leisure is negatively related to labour supply, this 
implies a negative correlation between errors in wage equation and labour supply equation. 
This is in line with the division bias explanation for the correlation between these error terms.   
 
Elasticities 
 
With models of this type, the parameter estimates do not directly reveal the sensitivity of 
labour supply for financial incentives. In particular, (uncompensated) elasticities for both 
spouses’ wage rates will be the main driving force behind the tax policy effects. To compute 
these, we have carried out some simulations. The individual elasticities vary across the 
sample. Since we want to use the model for policy analysis, we are mainly interested in 
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aggregate elasticities. We define the (own or cross) wage elasticity of labour supply of some 
given group of people (husbands or wives) as the percentage change in total desired hours of 
that group if all before tax wage rates (of husbands or wives) in that group rise by 1%.  
While this definition is a widely-used one in the analysis of labour supply, “labour supply 
elasticity” has a wide variety of other meanings. Many studies only consider the elasticities 
for the average (“representative”) family. In a highly non-linear model like ours, these 
elasticities are not necessarily very informative for the consequences of wage changes for a 
heterogeneous population. Another approach is to consider average elasticities instead of 
elasticities of the average. The average elasticity can be seen as a weighted aggregate 
elasticity of hours worked, where more weight is given to people with lower desired hours. 
Other studies look at elasticities of hours worked conditional upon participation. For policy 
analysis, however, the effect on participation is at least as important as the effect on hours 
worked given participation, particularly for married women, whose participation rate is below 
50 per cent. We compute elasticities taking full account of the (positive) impact of the wage 
rate on the participation decision (with desired hours equal to zero for non-participants). 
Actually, our results suggest that most of the sensitivity of labour supply for wage rates is 
driven by changes in the decision to participate. Elasticity calculations can also vary in the 
way in which the tax system is accounted for. We change all gross wage rates by 1 per cent 
and leave the tax system unaffected. The way in which net wage rates change is thus not 
fixed a priori, but driven by the existing tax system. On average, after tax wage rates will 
change by slightly less than 1 per cent, due to the progressive nature of the tax rules. In the 
case of family labour supply, elasticities vary with what is assumed about the spouse’s 
income and behavioural response. In line with the model introduced in Section 3, we assume 
that both spouses jointly adjust to the new family optimum; but similar results were found 
under the alternative assumption that each partner answered the question about desired hours 
on the assumption that their spouse’s hours would not change. 
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Table 6: Labour supply elasticities for married men and married women with 
respect to wage changes 
 Elasticity of average preferred hours to change 
in wages 
Change in: Husbands Wives 
Male wage 0.25 -0.35 
Female wage -0.07 0.83 
Both wages 0.18 0.48 
Note: A 1 per cent rise in the male wage leads to a 0.25 per cent rise in 
average preferred hours of married men, and a fall of 0.35 per cent in the 
average preferred hours of married women. 
 
 For men, we find an own wage elasticity of 0.25. That is, if all gross wage rates of the 
men in our sample would increase by 1%, while women’s wage rates remained unchanged, 
total desired hours of all men would increase by 0.25%., (with a 95 per cent confidence 
interval from 0.21 per cent to 0.30 per cent).10 Most of the effect is due to increased 
participation: a rise of all husband’s gross wage rates by 1% would induce an increase of  the 
number of men willing to participate by almost 0.2 percentage points, i.e. by 0.21% of the 
actual participation rate of almost 90%. For women, the estimated own wage elasticity is 0.83 
(confidence interval from 0.71 to 0.90).. The elasticity of the participation rate is 0.49 and 
thus again explains the largest part of the labour supply elasticity. These estimates are in line 
with other findings for Ireland (e.g, Doris, 2001) and with the broad range of  empirical 
findings of labour supply elasticities for other countries (see Blundell and Macurdy, 1999) , 
even though, as explained above, a comparison is hampered by the fact that the large number 
of empirical studies are based on an almost as large number of elasticity concepts. 
 We find cross wage elasticities of –0.07 for men and –0.35 for women. As a 
consequence, if all wage rates of both men and women increased by 1%, the model predicts 
that desired hours would rise by 0.25-0.07=0.18% for men, and by 0.48% for women. 
The analysis deals with desired or preferred hours of work at the wage rate the 
individual currently commands. This allows for considerable simplification over analyses 
which must deal with the potential for involuntary unemployment or actual hours of work 
which diverge from preferred hours. It can also be seen as allowing for maximum flexibility 
in labour market response. In some circumstances changes in desired hours will not translate 
into changes in actual hours because of constraints on individual behaviour (e.g., having to 
choose between full-time and part-time work; or being involuntarily unemployed). 
Nevertheless, it is of interest that the own-wage elasticities for men and women reported by 
                                                 
10 Strictly speaking these are quasi-confidence intervals, derived from a simulation procedure. 
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Callan and van Soest (1996), based on 1987 data on actual hours and incorporating modelling 
of involuntary unemployment and constraints on hours, are quite similar to those reported 
here (0.15 for men, 0.67 for women). 
 
5. Tax Treatment of Couples 
Over time a number of countries have moved from systems involving “income-splitting” or 
extensive transferability of allowances between spouses to systems involving greater 
independence in the tax treatment of husband and wives – and, correspondingly, more 
restricted transferability of allowances and/or bands.11 More recently the Irish tax system has 
moved towards greater independence in the tax treatment of couples, in what has been termed 
“individualisation” of the standard rate tax band. There has been considerable speculation 
about the likely impact of this change on the participation of married women in the paid 
labour market. Analysis of the type set out here is necessary to provide estimates of likely 
impacts which can be used to inform the debate. 
The Irish tax system – like the UK system – initially treated married couples as a unit 
for income tax purposes, with the wife’s income being aggregated along with that of her 
husband. While there was a “married man’s allowance”, tax was assessed on the basis of the 
same band width as for single persons. Compared to two cohabiting single persons, a married 
couple received a marriage subsidy if the wife was not earning an independent income, or 
earned a very low one. But if the wife’s earnings were greater, she, and the couple, faced a 
substantial tax penalty – a married couple with both partners in employment could face a 
much higher tax bill than an unmarried couple in identical circumstances. 
The Supreme Court ruled that this feature of the tax system was unconstitutional. A 
number of responses to this ruling may have been possible. The one chosen by the 
government, and implemented in Budget 1980, was to allow doubled rate bands and doubled 
allowances to all married couples. Formally, this was equivalent to allowing “income 
splitting” i.e., calculating the couple’s tax liability on the basis of assigning half the income to 
each partner and taxing them as if they were single. It was also equivalent to full 
transferability not only of allowances but also of rate bands. Married couples were permitted 
to minimise their tax liabilities by assigning allowances and rate bands freely to either 
                                                 
11 See OECD, 1977; Callan et al., 2001. O’Donoghue and Sutherland (1999) found that 10 out of 15 EU 
countries had income tax systems which were based around independent or individual taxation of husbands and 
wives. 
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partner. This structure operated from 1980 up to 2000, so it is the system which obtained 
when the 1994 data were collected. 
The Budget for the year 2000 introduced a move towards greater independence of 
taxation, by means of what was termed “individualisation” of the standard rate tax band. This 
involved restricting the extent to which tax bands are transferable between spouses. In 1999 
the standard rate band was £14,000 for an individual, or £28,000 for a couple i.e., a non-
earning partner could transfer 100% of his or her tax band (and, indeed, of his/her allowance). 
In 2000, full transferability of tax allowances remained as before, but there were, in effect, 
restrictions on the transferability of the standard rate band. The band for a single person was 
increased from £14,000 to £17,000 per annum; for a married couple with one income the 
band remained unchanged at £28,000 per annum; but the band for a married couple, both 
earning, rose to £34,000 (twice the single band, thereby meeting the requirement of “no 
marriage penalty”). Thus, in effect, only two thirds [(28,000-17,000)/17,000=11/17] of a non-
earning partner’s band was transferable.12 The stated objective was to arrive at a position 
after three years where each individual, whether single or married, has his/her own standard 
rate tax band which can be set off against his/her own income but cannot be transferred 
between spouses. By December 2001 the proportion of the band which was transferable had 
fallen to about one-third, remaining at that level after Budget 2003. 
In what follows, we model a very similar policy change, with transferability of 
allowances being maintained, but transferability of rate bands removed. This has the incipient 
effect of raising tax revenues. We examine two revenue-neutral approaches. In one, the 
incipient revenue gain is returned to households in the form of an increase in child benefit – 
reflecting the fact that the main justification for the income-splitting policy (given in the 
Budget speech for the year 1979) was to provide support for families with children. 
Alternatively, revenue neutrality could be attained by an across the board cut in taxes. In both 
cases there are substantial reductions in the effective marginal tax rates facing second earners 
in a couple. 
 
6. Simulating the Labour Supply Impact of Tax Reforms 
In this section we analyse the first order labour supply effects of the tax reform proposal 
described above. Our structural model is particularly useful to do this, since it accounts for 
the complete structure of the tax system, including nonconvexities. Moreover, the model 
                                                 
12 In the immediate aftermath of the budget, a special Home Carer’s Allowance was introduced for couples with 
one partner staying at home to care for a child or children, an elderly person or someone with a disability. 
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predicts the effects on participation as well as the distribution of hours worked. The way in 
which the effects are predicted is very similar to the method of computing the elasticities in 
Section 4. Using the parameter estimates, we first predict labour supply using the actual 1994 
tax rules. We then repeat the simulation using the tax rules after the reform. Comparing the 
two outcomes gives the predicted changes. For the simulation after the reform, we assume 
that before tax wage rates remain the same. Thus general equilibrium effects are not taken 
into account: we consider the first order effects only.13 
Table 7 shows the impact of alternative ways of implementing increased 
independence in the tax treatment of husbands and wives. Option (A) simply involves the 
elimination of transferability of the standard rate tax band, and would generate something 
over £200m per annum in extra tax revenue.14 Option (B) returns this revenue to taxpayers, 
via proportionate cuts in the standard and top tax rates. Option (C) is also revenue neutral, but 
the incipient rise in revenue is used to fund an increased child benefit. 
Table 7: Response of Husbands’ and Wives’ Participation Rates to Increased Independence in 
Tax Treatment of Married Couples 
Change in tax structure % point change 
in husbands’ 
participation rate 
% point change 
in wives’ 
participation rate 
Net change in Exchequer 
revenue as estimated by 
SWITCH on full sample15 
(A) Standard rate band made 
non-transferable 
 
-0.5 
 
+1.8 
 
 +Ir£210m 
(B)  Band non-transferable, 
tax rates cut to 25.4% 
and 45.1% 
 
-0.1 
 
+2.6 
 
 -Ir£8m 
(C)  Band non-transferable, 
Child Benefit increased 
by 69% 
 
-0.9 
 
+1.6 
 
 +Ir£1m 
 
 A notable feature of option (A) is that it gives rise to a net increase in labour market 
participation (a fall in married men’s participation being more than offset by a rise in the 
participation of married women), while at the same time actually increasing net revenue for 
the Exchequer. Options (B) and (C), returning this revenue via general tax cuts or via child 
benefit, are designed to be approximately revenue neutral.16 Option (B), combining non-
transferable bands with cuts in tax rates, gives rise to a sharp rise in married women’s 
participation, and leaves men’s participation almost unchanged. Option (C), using the 
                                                 
13 Our results can in principle serve as input for a macro-economic general equilibrium type of model based 
upon micro foundations. 
14 All calculations are undertaken in a 1994 setting. 
15 In euro terms, the exchequer costs were about €266m, €10m and €1.3m for options A, B and C respectively. 
16As noted earlier, this is revenue neutrality on a static basis; increases (falls) in participation/hours would give 
rise to increased (reduced) revenues. 
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revenue from restrictions on transferability to fund an increased child benefit, also boosts 
married women’s participation, but leads to a fall in men’s participation. 
What about the total labour supply response, in terms of desired hours of work? 
Under option (A), the rise in average desired hours of work for women is almost offset by a 
fall in desired hours for men. Under option (B), which includes a significant cut in tax rates 
as well, the response of married women is more positive, and that of married men is less 
negative. As a result, the overall labour supply response for married couples is positive – and 
the response of single people, not simulated here in the present framework, would also be 
positive.. Under option (C), the gain in tax revenue arising from non-transferability is applied 
to fund a rise in child benefit. This gives rise to a fall in male labour supply which is only 
partially offset by a rise in the labour supply of married women. 
How do these results compare with the labour supply impact of simply cutting tax 
rates, or increasing tax free allowances (the “zero rate band”)? We simulated the impact of 
alternative forms of tax cut on labour supply. Table 8 shows the impact on participation rates, 
which again is the driving force in the overall change. The cost of each tax cut was calibrated 
to be about €250m, which could finance a cut in the standard rate of tax (initially 27 per cent) 
of close to 3 percentage points (or 6 percentage points for the higher rate). It is clear that the 
impact on married women’s participation in the labour market of the change in tax treatment 
of couples is substantially greater than for each of these forms of tax cut. The overall labour 
supply impact of the structural package based on a revenue-neutral tax cut is also greater than 
that of  
 
Table 8: Response of the Labour Force Participation Rate to Selected Tax Cuts 
Tax Cut Option Change in husbands’  
participation rate 
Change in wives’  
participation rate 
Standard rate cut by 2.8 
percentage points 
 
+0.5 
 
+0.6 
Top rate cut by 6.3 percentage 
points 
 
+0.1 
 
+1.0 
Standard rate band up by 
Ir£2400 from Ir£8200 
 
+0.2 
 
+1.1 
Personal allowances increased 
by Ir£465 from Ir£2350 
 
+0.5 
 
+0.5 
Note: All options had an Exchequer cost of about £200m per annum (€250m), including the impact on single 
persons. 
 
Our results indicate a greater impact of a change in the tax treatment of couples on Irish 
labour supply than that found by Steiner and Wrohlich (2006) for Germany, using a similar 
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approach. But it is also of interest to assess the scale of this potential impact against the 
backdrop of the strong growth in married women’s labour market participation over the past 
40 years. Table 9 shows how married women’s participation grew by about 1.3 percentage 
points per year under the joint (aggregation) tax regime, by 1.6 percentage points per year 
under the income-splitting regime, and in the past 7 years, by about 1.1 percentage points. It 
is evident that a boost to participation of the order of  2 to 3 percentage points, as identified 
by our model using cross section data, is swamped in a time series context by the strength of 
trend factors driving growth in married women’s participation. Over the twenty years from 
1980, the participation rate rose by about 30 percentage points: in this context the boost to 
participation from a change in tax structure is small. 
  
Table 9: Married women’s labour market participation rate, 
and tax treatment of couples, 1971-2007 
Year Joint 
Income-
splitting Quasi-independent 
1971 7.5%   
1977 14.4%   
1979 17.9%   
1981  16.7%  
1987  23.4%  
1989  23.7%  
1991  30.2%  
1992  32.5%  
1993  34.5%  
1994  36.0%  
1995  37.7%  
1996  40.9%  
1997  41.5%  
1998  43.2%  
1999  44.9%  
2000   45.9% 
2001   46.6% 
2002   48.0% 
2003   48.3% 
2004   49.2% 
2005   51.3% 
2006   52.4% 
2007   53.5% 
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 7. Conclusions      
We have constructed a discrete choice structural labour supply model which is able to capture 
important features of household labour supply behaviour from a policy point of view: the 
model accounts for the full structure of the tax rules; it simultaneously captures the 
participation decision and the decision on hours worked, by allowing for fixed costs of work; 
it appropriately accounts for missing information on wage rates; it does not impose quasi-
concavity of preferences and thus avoids the MaCurdy critique that elasticities are largely 
determined a priori. We have estimated the model using Irish data and have obtained 
elasticities which are well in line with other recent findings, and are robust for changes in the 
specification. The usefulness of our approach is illustrated by applying it to analyse the  
extent to which changes in the tax treatment of couples may boost married women’s labour 
market participation. 
We consider a reform to the tax treatment of couples, making their taxes more 
independent and thereby reducting marginal tax rates on second earners. Our model identifies 
a labour supply impact that is  larger than those for quite substantial cuts in taxes, and much 
larger than those found by Steiner and Wrohlich (2006) using similar methods for Germany. 
However they are small in relation to the strong trend growth in married women’s 
participation. 
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